Re: Squat Army WAS Re: [Epic] Knights(Lil' bit off topic)

From: Thane Morgan <thane_at_...>
Date: Mon, 09 Feb 1998 13:02:04 -0700

Los wrote:
>
> Thane Morgan wrote:
>
> > The other thing to remember from this is that commanders get
> > over-confident in their high tech weaponry; a bunch of "trash" with
> > automatic rifles can put out a lot of lead, and there is no full body
> > armor in the real world that will take that kind of crap. In this
> > case,
> > the weapon was what determined the value of the troops, not the actual
> >
> > troop quality.
> >
>
> I have to disagree with you there. First off niether side had much in
> the way of high tech weaponry, this was an rifle/machinegun grenade
> launcher fight from beginning to end. Yes we did have a few gunships
> too. Numbers and terrain were the overriding factor here. This was an
> Ishlawand type situation.
>
> Pl;anning was of course a problem, (dickhead staffs!) In particular
> compartmentalization. Firsdt off there was no US reaction force alerted
> ahead of time. One thing that the Somalia articlae doesn't cober was the
> fact that an infantry company task force from the 10th ID fought a
> seperate ten hour action through the city to get to the rangers and help
> them escape. They lost a couple killed and about 15 wounded though this
> was never reported. Turns out that a Pakistani battalion that was the
> QRF (quick Reaction force) for that day, though alerted ahead of time,
> refused to leave their billest becasue of the prospect of real action.
>
> Cardinal rule number one when working with UN troops (have done this a
> few toimes myself includiing 6 months i Haiti). YOU CAN NEVER rely on
> any forces excpet those from your own country. From a US perspective,
> this rule can be bent to include UK, French, Dutch troops but that's
> about it. Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Middle Eastern and most of these other
> third world armies are absolutely worthless in any real shooting
> situation. In part because they make more money in a year of UN duty
> thatn they'll amke in ten years of work at home so they will be set when
> they get back to their country. This means no reason to risk your neck.
>
> Sorry if this offends anuyone but I have been out there for twenty years
> and my job has had nme living and working with foreign armies for a
> great patrt of that time. It's my opinion, but it's also one shared
> byvthe majority of my peers, both in US SF and in UK SAS. While any
> third world country can be made into a proper fighting force with the
> right training and motivation, the vast majority of the world's armoies
> haven't got a clue. They may be good a killing, but are downright lousy
> soldiers and can't poor piss out of a boot with the instructions
> wriitten on the heel.
>
> A few last thouights aboutthe Somalia thing. The US learned a hell of a
> lot about coordination, and who can be relied upon in a crunch. Many of
> these lessons were put to excellent use in the Haiti operation, which
> could have gone the same way a few times. Also, starnge as it may seem,
> the Somalia battle is looked upon with great pride with those that
> fought there. Given the overwhelming situation they were in, and the
> small forces involved, all the US forces there, SF, Rangers, Delta, and
> 10th ID rightly feel that they came out pretty good in what was one hell
> of a long protracted firefight. Very much tactical training, methodology
> and doctrine on the grunt level was validated in that fight. A lot more
> valuable experience came out of that as oppposed to Desert Storm when it
> comes to goof old grunt level house to house fighting. Most all
> verterans of that fight are pretty much held in awe by their peers, sort
> of like the roarke's drift survivors must have been.
>
> As an aside, one of my medics was there in the fight, and he treated a
> guy that took an RPG in the side. It penetrated his body armor (Not hard
> to do in the side) and STUCK inside of him, fins out one side, nose come
> out the otehr without detonating. He died anyway of course..
>
> Los

Agreed on the planning clusterfuck. They should never have sent such a
small force to do such a big job, and the quality of the trooops and US
weaponry did show through when the numbers involved on each side were
leveled out.

They suposedly applied some of these lessons to Bosnia as well.

Incidentally, I went to college with an ethiopian exchange student; some
friends of mine took him out shooting with them one day, and they said
he hit a bullseye from 80-90 yards off seven time in a row. Turns out
markmenship is highly valued in Ethiopia.

Thane
Received on Mon Feb 09 1998 - 20:02:04 UTC